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Approaches to environmental policy
Like any other policy, an environmental policy has to compromise be- 
tween different demands and expectations, many of which often in con- 
flict with one other. Conservationists would like to protect natural 
habitats from economic development. On the other hand industrialists 
demand that protection measures do not hamper growth and do not im- 
pose excessive burdens on firms. Social critics are concerned with dis- 
tributing environmental protection costs fairly between groups and 
strata. In this regard three notions are crucial: effectiveness; efficiency; 
eąuity.
A policy is called effectice, if it solves the problem it was supposed to. 
Effective policies are those which clean the air, restore lakes and save 
species from extension. The ąuestion of effectiveness does not refer to the 
costs which such policies may imply, nor does it take into account any so­
cial problems, which may arise as a result of their implementation.
In contrast, economists are concerned with the idea of efficiency, 
which attempts to take into account both costs and effects of a given po­
licy or action. This implies that effects are madę commensurate with 
costs by evaluating the former in the same units as the latter. A policy is 
said to be efficient, if its costs are justified in terms of its effects, or to 
put it morę precisely - if it maximizes the net effects of the costs. As in 
the case of effectiveness, the idea of efficiency leaves aside the ąuestion 
of fairness, that is who pays the cost, and who benefits from the effects.
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Unlike effectiveness, however, efficiency addresses the ąuestion of 
whether a policy is worthwhile. Thus an efficient air ąuality policy raises 
emission abatement reąuirements as long as the incremental (marginal) 
benefits resulting from the cleaner air exceed the costs of the cheapest 
alternative to meeting such reąuirements.
Efficiency is a difficult concept to apply, as environmental benefits are 
often difficult to evaluate in economic terms. This is why a somewhat 
less stringent concept of cost-effectiveness has been in common use. 
A cost - efficient policy achieves any given effect in a least- cost way. 
Thus, if one objective is to clean up a lakę, of all the effective policies the 
cost effective policy will be the one that restores the lakę to life at the 
minimum cost. It should be stressed here that neither effectiveness nor 
cost efficient per se provide a criterion for judging whether a policy is 
worthwhile pursuing, that is - in the example above - whether the lakę 
should be restored or should the economy’s scarce resources be spent on 
something else. Efficiency provides such a theoretical criterion but, of 
course there are additional aspects of environmental policy that have to 
be taken into account.
Fairness has been another important issue raised in connection with 
environmental policies ever sińce such policies started to be formulated 
and implemented. There is no universally accepted definition of fairness 
and economists prefer to talk about eąuity whenever they discuss the 
distribution of costs and benefits among the parties concerned.
Making a policy eąuitable means balancing costs and benefits across 
all the parties concerned by appropriately distributing benefits and/or 
letting beneficiaries pay an adeąuate share of the costs. For instance, 
a policy aimed at biodiversity preservation will be judged ineąuitable, if 
its costs affect the local populations in the areas adjacent to protected 
habitats - for example, by constraining development opportunities - 
without offering them a fair share of the benefits of conservation.
As seen this brief overview above, environmental policies can be 
judged from several different perspectives. Economists tend to focus on 
efficiency ąuestions. Whilst difficult to answer, for two reasons these are 
extremely important.
Firstly, it is not sufficient to design a set of cost - efficient policies to 
address environmental problems, such as specific levels of acid- rain 
abatement, solid- waste disposal and so on. Even though each of these 
problems should be individually solved in a least cost way, there is no 
reason to believe that the composite outcome will be what people would 
prefer to have, given the costs to be borne. It might turn out for instance, 
that euthropication control becomes too strict in relation to waste dis­
posal measures. And that it would be better to relax the euthropication
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Controls a little and to switch the resources saved in this way to improve 
the sustainability of the waste disposal system.
Secondly, the combined society resources spent on the environment 
as a result of the series of cost - efficient sectoral policies might turn out 
to be too little or too much in comparison with what was spent on meet- 
ing other needs.
Optimizing Economic Policy
If economists were to advise on designing environmental policies, the 
most likely suggestions would be to achieve efficiency by maximi- 
zing net aggregate benefits. In principle, this approach does not have 
to contradict equity considerations. For if a policy is efficient, it is always 
possible to distribute its net benefits in such way as to make everybody 
better off than under a non- efficient scenario.
However, studying real-life policy cases proves that the distribution of 
costs and benefits is most often ignored. Not only might this imply that 
the benefits do not match the costs borne by various individuals, but also 
that some individuals are sometimes even worse off.. This is a typical 
outcome of the of many policies aimed at increased efficiency - especially 
in countries without social security arrangements. Thus the core of ef­
ficiency - that is the possibility of enjoying the maximized sum of net 
benefits - turns out to be a privilege distributed in a not necessarily 
fair way. Despite that, many economists have viewed efficiency as an 
ideał reference point for designing sound environmental policies. If a po­
licy is to be efficient, it should aim at eąuating marginal costs (MC) to 
the marginal benefits (MB) of environmental protection. The MB = MC 
criterion has largely remained only a theoretical reference point for vari- 
ous policy instruments. One reason why policy makers have not followed 
this economic prescription is that any estimates of the marginal costs 
and marginal benefits are affected by a wide margin of uncertainty. For 
different reasons, however, neither benefits nor costs can usually be 
known with accuracy sufficient to adopt the MB = MC rule as a practical 
guide. The criterion that marginal costs for abating different sources of 
pollution should be equal, the MCi = MCj rule, is easier to apply sińce it 
requires cost data only.
Theoretically, it is possible to introduce any policy instrument in an 
economically optimal way. Nevertheless, environmental standards and 
other regulations are most often justified in non- economic terms. As a re­
sult, they are unlikely to be sufficient or even cost-effective. For instance, 
an efficient pollution permit should allow emissions up to the point where 
the marginal abatement costs equate to the marginal damage caused by
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the remaining (unabated) pollution. In real life, pollution permits are is- 
sued following an evaluation which obviously takes into account some cost 
and benefit considerations although in a very rough way.
Similarly, a cost - effective pollution standard should allow every 
source to emit an amount, such that the sum adds up to a total which 
does not exceed the policy objective, while letting all sources eąuate their 
marginal abatement costs. In real life, standards are usually indepen­
dent of the number of sources they apply to. Thus, the morę polluters, 
the less likely is the achievement of an environmental objective; thus 
standards may fail to be effective. Moreover, the same standards applied 
to various emission sources typically imply different marginal costs and 
thus fail to be cost effective.
Choosing policy instrument
Apart from standards and traditional permits, a number of economic 
and market oriented Instruments are also applied. Environmentalists 
know however there are always two sides to a problem. Indeed a lot of 
destruction is observed within the framework of market forces both in 
the developed and the less- developed world. It is, therefore, necessary to 
investigate as objectively as possible what can be expected from mar- 
kets, what information they can successfully process and where they 
may do morę harm than good.
The distinction between scalę and allocation decisions has proven 
to be a useful methodological starting - point. To regulate the environ- 
ment means to decide to what extent a given environmental resource 
could be used and what portion of the resource should be allocated to 
any of its potential users. The first decision addresses the scalę aspect, 
the second the allocation.
These two aspects can also be addressed separately. But they can also 
be treated jointly by starting with the allocation of tasks and arriving at 
the overall scalę as a result of individual contributions. Also, market 
forces can be utilized to determine either of the aspects. However, there 
is a elear distinction between the role which markets are capable of play- 
ing in either case.
This separation principle is well illustrated by so called marketable 
permits. They differ from traditional pollution permits in that, under 
certain conditions, they can be treated as commodities, that is, bought 
and sold. The volume of all the permits issued by the government agency 
determines the scalę aspect of a policy. The allocation, however, is left to 
market forces either by auctioning the permits, or by making them 
transferable after having them distributed in an administrative way.
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Marketable permits utilize market forces in the exact domain where the 
latter can play an outstanding role and keep them away from where 
they might sometimes bring morę harm than good.
The reason why marketable permits can achieve cost-effectiveness is 
that they go to those who are the most willing to pay for them, that is, to 
where environmental protection would have been most expensive. On 
the other hand, those who sell these permits do not need them sińce pre- 
sumably they can afford environmental protection at a lower cost than 
the permit price. In this way marketable permits stimulate the under- 
taking of protection measures where they are cheap and help to avoid 
them where they are costly.
Pollution taxes, are perhaps, the best known economic Instruments 
designed for environmental policies. In principle, by raising such taxes 
to the level of marginal benefits(MB) from reduced pollution we can 
achieve economic efficiency. This is because a tax whose ratę is MB 
would motivate polluters to abate, as long as they incur marginal costs 
(MC) lower than the tax ratę. Thus such a tax makes ii possible for the 
MB = MC rule to work. A pollution tax charged at this optimal ratę is 
called a Pigou (Pigouvian) tax after the name of an economist who ana- 
lyzed pollution taxes in the 1920's.
The choice between marketable permits and other economic Instru­
ments, such as charges or taxes, is a choice between assigning priority to 
the economy or the environment. With taxes, in an uncertain world 
where the exact values of MB and MC are not known, there is less likeli- 
hood of being surprised by the financial outcome of environmental po- 
licy. On the contrary with marketable permits there is less likelihood of 
being surprised by the scalę of protection even though its costs are some­
times difficult to predict.
The cases of Sweden, Poland and Lithuania
A major role, which economic Instruments are supposed to play, is to 
lower the cost of achieving environmental objectives by efficiently or cost 
- effectively allocating abatement tasks. This can be achieved either by 
distributing marketable permits or levying Pigouvian taxes.
There are almost no practical applications of Pigouvian taxes. The sul- 
phur dioxide and nitrogen oxide taxes adopted in Sweden in 1991 pro- 
vide perhaps the only two exceptions to this rule. Set at 40 SEK/kg 
(~5.30 USD), the Swedish charges are quite uniąue. At first glance, the 
sulphur charge seems to be biting. It was established at this high level 
only after the sulphur emissions problem had been largely solved in 
Sweden. Emissions is fairly Iow and the tax is not a heavy burden on
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polluters. Nor does it provide substantial revenues for the budget. The 
nitrogen charge is a different story. Nitrogen oxide emissions continue to 
be high and difficult to abate (road traffic). The Swedish charge is levied 
on power plants only. The money collected is paid back to the polluters, 
yet in proportion to the electricity sold, not to the pollution emitted. The 
charge therefore acts as a Pigouvian tax levied above a certain threshold 
limit. The limit is the average emission per unit of electricity produced. 
Those power plants that emit morę than average are net payers. Those 
that emit below the average receive morę than they pay.
In accordance with what is expected by economic theory, the Swedish 
nitrogen tax has turned out to be an excellent tool of environmental poli- 
cies. It vividly depicts the fundamental problems with implementing eco- 
logical taxes. These taxes cannot provide sustainable revenues as they 
instantly erode their tax base, namely polluting.
In other countries pollution taxes either do not exist or they are set at 
much lower levels. Lithuania and Poland are examples of countries 
where hundreds of pollutants, wastes and other forms of environmental 
degradation are subject to fees.
In Poland these rates are high, usually higher than in western Eu­
ropę. For instance the sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide fee is 
0.24 PLN/ kg (-0.09 USD/kg ). This is almost two orders of magnitude 
less than in Sweden, but still higher than in virtually any other country. 
Given the conditions prevailing in Poland, it is estimated that the theo- 
retical Pigouvian ratę of the sulphur dioxide tax should be around 
1.50 PLN/kg. Does the existing lower ratę play any useful role at all 
thought?
All together Polish environmental fees produce slightly over 1 bln 
PLN a year. They raise special purpose funds, which operate indepen- 
dently of the state budget and their total revenues are too Iow to be a se- 
rious alternative to traditional taxation. Nevertheless, for environmental 
protection, which in the recovery phase needs the support of a public 
fund, this money is substantial. It is because of the availability of this 
money that Poland has enjoyed visible progress regarding the state of 
the environment, especially when compared with the rest of Central and 
Eastern Europę. Presently in Poland environmental funds finance 
around 40% of environmental investments.
In Lithuania, virtually all pollutants emitted into the air or water are 
subject to fees whose nominał rates are rather high. These rates are 
somewhat lower than in Poland, but also higher than almost anywhere 
else. However, because of the system of waivers and lowered rates for 
certain source categories, the actual payments of firms are rather smali.
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In both the Polish and Lithuanian systems, the revenues from pollu- 
tion charges are at least partially channelled to special purpose funds 
and earmarked for environmental protection.
If fees are set below the Pigouvian levels, the pollution fees do not per- 
form the role envisaged by economic theory. Instead they play a role of 
raising revenues that later could be spent on the environment. That is 
why under these circumstances marketable permits seem to be a reliable 
instrument in abating pollution at a time of rapid structural changes. 
Marketable permits actually create a new market and do not reąuire 
special administration, while taxes do. Of course the lack of an adeąuate 
legał framework hinders the implementation of marketable permits in 
everyday practice. However, the experiment carried out in Poland in 
1991 serves as an excellent example of the application of marketable 
permits.
Pigouvian taxes and marketable permits do not exhaust the list of 
market - oriented policy Instruments. Ali European countries have im- 
plemented at least some economic Instruments. Their role is to lower the 
cost of meeting environmental reąuirements by offering incentives, in­
stead of changing specific actions, technologies or eąuipment. While it is 
possible to demonstrate the savings thus obtained, in generał, achieving 
efficiency is rather unlikely. To achieve efficiency by eąuating MC and 
MB, policy makers ought to rely either on Pigouvian taxes or on market­
able permits.
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